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What binds a democratic society together? This would seem a well-rehearsed topic in modern 
political theory, but on closer scrutiny, it may appear less so. If we reformulate the question, 
it may become clearer why: What binds democratic society together? The emphasis on 
‘democratic’ is the clue here. Much recent discussion on the cohesive force in democracies 
has been parasitic on other debates, such as that between cosmopolitans and communitarians 
on justice as the first virtue of society; that between nation state-based and post-national 
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views of contemporary politics; or that about the cultural aspects of democratic citizenship as 
the glue that makes democracy work. All such views and debates tend to assume a somewhat 
‘externalist’ perspective, so to speak, of the problem of cohesion in democracies. 
Cosmopolitans and liberal communitarians have argued over the relative importance of 
values and identity as the basis for the stability of a just society, whose legitimate political 
arrangements they generally agree must be democratic, so to reflect the demands of equality 
and self-government. Disputes over whether the institutions of democracy still require the 
background conditions provided by the nation-state, with its consolidated networks of party 
system, solidarity, civil society organizations, and public opinion formation, or whether 
similar conditions can be reproduced at a more trans- and post-national level, are very similar 
in scope to those between cosmopolitans and liberal communitarians. Both these disputes 
concern social, institutional, ideal or identitarian pre-conditions of democracy, which help it 
to work with a modicum of stability, in so far as they guarantee the political cohesion of 
either the demos or the regime itself. Discussions over the quality and competence of 
citizenship look at democratic culture as an important condition for democratic institutions 
and procedures to function smoothly and effectively. Debates over the ‘civil culture’ in the 
1960s and more recently on ‘social capital’ lay emphasis on a mixture of attitudes, practices, 
participation in associational networks, and consolidated norms of sociability as formative 
components of democratic citizenship, on which the working of democratic institutions and 
rules depend. This suggests something more internal, or at least a virtuous circle between the 
culture and the institutions of democracy. But is democracy itself capable of producing 
political cohesion, and on what basis? 
In addressing this more ‘internalist’ question, the Critical Exchange explores three 
different perspectives, which follow from the work of three of the participants, who have 
recently contributed to new developments in the democratic literature. Matteo Bonotti (2017) 
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has written on democratic partisanship from the perspective of political liberalism; Joseph 
Lacey (2017) on the institutional dynamics of democracy in diverse societies; and Sofia 
Näsström (forthcoming) on the theory of democratic peoplehood. Each of them reflects on 
how, from their own democratic perspective, one can make sense of political cohesion as a 
product, rather than as a pre-condition, of democracy and of its practices. The emphasis on 
the internalist view does not necessarily exclude that political cohesion is also the product of 
other more external conditions, but the aim of this Critical Exchange is to press the internalist 
argument and to assess how each of the perspectives proposed by Bonotti, Lacey, and 
Näsström fare in contributing to such a task. Their interventions are followed by several 
critical reflections, respectively by Jonathan White, Richard Bellamy and David Owen, who 
offer their own view on how successful each perspective is in promoting political cohesion. 
The particular positions defended by Bonotti, Lacey, and Näsström in some way 
parallel the three externalist perspectives on which political cohesion is normally predicated, 
emphasizing respectively more ideal-regarding, more institutional, and more substantive 
conceptions of democracy. As they argue in their own interventions, the features of 
democracy to which they give priority offer distinctive resources for political cohesion. 
Building on the recent normative literature on partisanship, Bonotti offers a revised view of 
normative consensus in political liberalism. Overcoming the tensions that the fact of 
disagreement and different conceptions of the good necessarily produce in modern societies 
is a central tenant of political liberalism. Ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason 
have been offered as the basis for a well-ordered society. Bonotti’s specific contribution is to 
show how partisanship, as a core aspect of the political system of democratic societies, can 
have a reconciling rather than divisive effect on normative agreement, thus contributing to 
the formation of consensus and a sense of obligation towards just institutional arrangements 
and to political cohesion. The two main ways in which Bonotti thinks partisanship can 
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contribute to this are, first, its role in creating a two-level system of political inclusion, so that 
allegiance to political parties, which operate within and are supportive of the political 
community, also transfer into allegiance toward the political community itself. Secondly, 
parties and partisanship can reduce the ‘justificatory burden’ that public reason demands by 
filtering the discourses and preferences that ordinary citizens articulate more directly through 
the values and doctrines of their own comprehensive view of the good, and giving it a form 
more amenable to public reason, so to produce an overlapping consensus on which the law 
and general policy making can be justified to the entire political community. According to 
such a view, allowing and promoting democratic partisanship has the paradoxical effect of 
binding the community together in spite of the fact that partisanship itself is an expression of 
the division intrinsic to the political community. In his comment, Jonathan White elaborates 
on the capacity of partisanship to help public discussion in democratic societies by 
formulating the particular demands and reasons of citizens in generalizable ways, so making 
partisanship and public reason not just compatible, but, in Bonotti’s view, ‘mutually 
dependent.’ But he also raises the question of whether such a view of partisanship may rest 
on an unduly idealized conceptions of parties, which may be easily dismissed by those critics 
who points to the widespread process of bureaucratization of parties and the declining trust 
that citizens have on them and the political system in general. White’s own view, however, is 
that empirical reality presents a motley panorama, and that in such a reality there are 
examples that can be used as normative-generating standards. Besides, in Bonotti’s argument 
he finds not only an indication of normative exemplary parties, but also of normative 
exemplary party system on which it may be possible to rebuild the trust in parties and 
promote the cohesive functions of partisanship. 
Although the context of Joseph Lacey is also democracy in diverse societies, his focus 
is more on the way in which democratic institutions can have a ‘centripetal’ function 
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supportive of political cohesion in conditions of diversity. As in Bonotti, partisanship plays a 
role in couching citizens’ particular claims and demands in the more general language of the 
common good. But this process is only part of a more general opportunity structure that 
democratic institutions offer, in Lacey’s view, to ‘maximise equal opportunity for control.’ 
This he regards as the proper purpose of modern democracy. In the conditions of modernity, 
where ordinary citizens have limited time for politics, where decisions are complex, and 
where territorial dimensions make impossible a forum-style decision-making process, Lacey 
thinks that democratic institutional design needs to follow what he calls, along the lines of 
Rawls’ equivalent principle for justice, the ‘democratic difference principle.’ In other words, 
the distribution of citizens’ opportunities in controlling and directing the decision-making 
process must be such that any increase for some citizens must bring with it an increase for 
each citizen. Lacey thinks that, properly designed, the representative system meets such a 
criterion without taxing too much the capacities of the citizens in modern democracies, but 
that such a system should be complemented by a number of more direct opportunities for 
citizens to express their first-order choice over certain policies and issues. In diverse 
societies, opportunity for bottom-up direct democracy would have the advantage of offering 
definite chances for people the feel they are controlling and directing decision making, and 
for them to find themselves on certain issues on the winning side, as a consequence of the 
formation of multiple majorities across a variety of issues on which citizens decide without 
the mediation of parties or the political class. Both opportunity structures would increase the 
sense of recognition felt by citizens across the social and cultural divides of society, thus 
increasing their political allegiance to the democratic system. The combined operations of 
decision making through representative elections and direct voting is what, according to 
Lacey provides a structure for the functioning of the public sphere and producing a 
centripetal effect through a form of ‘discursive integration,’ which he characterizes more as a 
 6 
process (hence akin to people engaging together in democratic control) than an outcome in 
the form of achieving consensus. For Lacey, the ability of engaging in this form of discursive 
integration is essential for overcoming deep diversity in society, and this is also why societies 
that lack the conditions for the exercise of discursive integration may find it difficult to 
develop political cohesion. As Richard Bellamy recognizes in his comment on Lacey, the 
latter’s institutional view of political cohesion as the product of the democratic opportunity 
structure is an interesting and fruitful one. But his main concern is that this tends to define the 
problem as mainly ‘vertical,’ in the identification of the citizens with authority and the 
political system, while neglecting the important ‘horizontal’ dimension of the way in which 
citizens relate to each other also in the decision-making process. The nature of the relations 
and different nature of the divisions between citizens is instead, for Bellamy, a crucial issue 
in determining the centripetal and/or centrifugal nature of the political system. In this respect, 
as he says, the problem of cohesion in democratic societies remains as much social as 
political, or, in other terms, as much external to the political process as internal to it. 
Sofia Näsström’s conception of democracy brings the social at the core of it. For her, 
democracy should be seen as a ‘political lifeform,’ whose directing principle in modern times 
is social emancipation. Democratic governance is therefore more than reconciling different 
world-views or finding appropriate institutional arrangements for collective decision making, 
but also, as she says following Brian Singer, a social project that involves a ‘struggle over 
society’ so to give it form. The principle, or ‘spirit’ (in the sense that Montesquieu uses it to 
define different political forms) of modern democracy consists in its capacity to emancipate 
its citizens. There are two characters that such spirit takes, according to Näsström, one is its 
open nature, which also implies that the democratic sovereign (‘we the people’) is never 
definitive, so leaving the demos open to constant re-definition; and the other is the 
importance that social policies regarding the organization of society (housing, work, and 
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welfare) or the wellbeing of the citizens (education, health) have for the fulfillment of the 
project of democratic emancipation. From such a perspective, the social and the political 
questions are strongly linked to each other, and therefore political cohesion is the effect of the 
way in which both combine. As Näsström observes, this, for instance, makes the dominant 
neo-liberal drive towards privatization inhospitable to the very project of democratic 
emancipation by undermining it at its very foundations. The privatization of social services 
and of public spaces is both divisive and anti-egalitarian, finding inspiration in principles of 
socio-political organization that are alien to emancipation, and which envisage instead a 
political community consisting of ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ In his comments, David Owen finds 
Näsström’s update of Montesquieu’s idea of an animating principle at the core of different 
political forms a powerful way of capturing what he calls the ‘infrastructures of democratic 
life.’ But he also finds a certain ambiguity, and circularity, in her definition of the democratic 
people who is the subject of the emancipatory project at the core of her conception of 
democracy as a lifeform. According to Owen, the ambiguity consists in the fact that the 
question of ‘who the people are’ can be asked in terms of its ‘scope’ (the boundaries of the 
democratic people) and of its ‘character’ (what makes a people democratic). Because the 
questions of scope and character are inextricably linked, the question of the territorial 
boundaries of the project of emancipation (and its effect on socio-political cohesion) cannot 
be entirely avoided. For Owen this raises questions on how the principle of democratic 
emancipation can be made to work, or tested, either in sub-state, municipal, contexts, or in 
relation to non-state associational networks. More to the point, the question arises whether in 
the present conditions of increasing globalization and international interconnection, the 
principle of emancipation can animate democracy not just within the state but also across 
states and in a more mobile world. 
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We seem to have come full circle. The starting point of this Critical Exchange was 
whether democracy is capable of generating political cohesion from its own internal 
mechanisms and principles; but at each stage, the question has re-emerged whether for 
democracy to work and be able to bind people together it also needs certain external 
conditions to be in place, or at least it needs its mechanisms and principles to partly adapt to 
them. 
Dario Castiglione 
 
Partisanship and Political Cohesion 
Political cohesion, as understood in this Critical Exchange, is the commitment to a common 
political project. In increasingly diverse societies, where citizens (and non-citizens) are often 
driven apart by their diverse ethical, religious and political beliefs, guaranteeing some degree 
of political cohesion is becoming ever more challenging. And nowadays this is true not only 
of societies which have historically been deeply divided, such as Northern Ireland or South 
Africa, but also of liberal democracies which while not having experienced deep levels of 
division in the past, are now becoming increasingly polarized (e.g. Muirhead 2014). 
In this contribution, I intend to examine the issue of political cohesion from the 
perspective of the concept of partisanship. This is a concept which, while having traditionally 
been central to much political science over the past few decades, has only recently been 
discovered by normative political theorists (Bonotti and Bader 2014; Muirhead 2014; 
Rosenblum 2008; White and Ypi 2016). Or, it would better to say, re-discovered, since the 
idea of partisanship has a long pedigree in the history of political thought, and has often been 
central to the analysis of the distinction between ‘factions’ and ‘parties’ (Ball 1989, Sartori 
1976, Scarrow 2006, Rosenblum 2008, and White and Ypi 2016), where the latter are 
sometimes (but not always) considered more committed to the public interest than the former. 
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One of the claims often advanced in the recent political theory literature is that the 
ethos of partisanship involves a willingness to compromise and not to resort to violent means 
in order to advance one’s political cause (Muirhead 2014, Rosenblum 2008). Sometimes this 
line of argument is accompanied by the more empirical claim that partisanship can lead to 
processes of ‘democratic acculturation’ (Rosenblum 2003) through which individuals and 
groups that might represent a threat to political cohesion can in fact become supportive or, at 
least, respectful of democratic norms and institutions, by being involved in partisan politics. 
These kinds of argument undeniably constitute a re-evaluation of parties and partisanship 
within the context of contemporary political theory, which has traditionally considered 
parties and partisanship inherently divisive, and therefore not worthy of much consideration. 
Yet an ethical appreciation of parties and partisanship cannot be limited to the idea of 
non-violent resolution of conflicts. And indeed other authors have recently focused on a 
deeper contribution that parties and partisanship can make to political cohesion, a 
contribution that is centred around the idea of public justification (White and Ypi 2011, 
2016). What renders ethical partisanship conducive to political cohesion, according to this 
view, is a commitment to the common good that is manifested through a commitment to 
publicly justifying parties’ proposed policies and manifestos on the basis of reasons that all 
members of the public (and not only one’s constituents) could accept. 
It is within this narrower approach to political cohesion that my recent book 
Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies is located. More specifically, the 
book examines partisanship’s contribution to political cohesion by focusing on John Rawls’s 
influential theory of political liberalism (Rawls 2005), and illustrating the different ways in 
which parties and partisanship can contribute to the public justification of laws and policies, 
thus integrating citizens who endorse diverse conceptions of the good within an overlapping 
consensus and guaranteeing both the political legitimacy and the stability of their societies. 
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The book’s central argument is that Rawls’s political liberalism fosters parties and 
partisanship, by leaving many key policy issues open to democratic contestation and 
justificatory disagreement, but that it also needs parties and partisanship, as the latter can play 
a key role in the articulation of public justifications. Within this political liberal framework, 
there are three ways in which I believe partisanship can contribute to political cohesion. 
First, political cohesion is about overcoming normatively relevant differences within 
diverse societies. It is, therefore, about overcoming the tension between citizens’ political and 
non-political obligations. If citizens have a moral duty to obey the law of their state (a claim 
that I take for granted for the sake of argument) but also have moral duties associated with 
their ethical or religious doctrines (a claim which, I believe, is sociologically 
uncontroversial), that tension may be deleterious for political cohesion. Many citizens, that is, 
will be pulled in different directions by their diverse conceptions of the good, rather than 
being drawn towards a shared political project. This will undermine both their political 
obligation (i.e. their moral duty to obey the law) and, consequently, the political legitimacy of 
the state and its laws. What is to be done? 
In my book I defend the view that partisans have special political obligations, i.e. a 
special moral duty to obey the law. These obligations are grounded both in the idea that 
normally partisans voluntarily consent to undertaking the duties of partisanship, which 
include the duty to obey the law (which is often legally codified), and in the view that 
partisans enjoy special benefits in liberal democracies, and have therefore a fair play-based 
moral duty to contribute to the production of those benefits, by obeying the law. But what if a 
political system is unfair? What if, even in the presence of broadly liberal democratic 
institutions, certain individuals and groups are systematically excluded from political 
influence? Can partisanship, in these cases, still generate any special political obligations? 
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One of the key aims of this symposium is to show how political processes can 
embody values and produce norms that may legitimate the political system and contribute to 
political cohesion in a way that goes beyond the avoidance of violent conflict. With respect to 
political obligation, one of the key ways in which this can be realized is by rendering the 
political system more inclusive towards the diverse values and demands advanced by the 
members of a political community. This can be done not only by avoiding laws that directly 
discriminate against certain political parties but also by providing parties with public funding, 
in order to prevent economic inequalities from translating into unequal influence on the 
political system, and especially by encouraging the formation of a diverse multi-party system 
through the adoption of proportional representation (PR). PR can enable a greater variety of 
citizens and groups to influence political decisions, compared to first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
electoral systems. All these reforms ought to be guided by the idea of public reason, i.e. they 
ought to be publicly justified by appealing to reasons that all members of the public could 
accept at some level of idealization. Overall, a fairer political system reduces the tension 
between citizens’ political and non-political obligations, by enabling them to shape the 
political system based on their non-political commitments. Moreover, as empirical research 
has shown (e.g. Tyler 2006, 2011), a fairer political system also more strongly motivates 
citizens to obey the law. 
But there is a second way in which political processes and institutions can produce 
norms that may legitimate the political system and contribute to political cohesion. A key 
way in which PR, as a form of electoral design, contributes to creating a fairer political 
system, is by providing different parties and partisans with what I call ‘justificatory pressure 
potential’ (Bonotti 2017, p. 34). Even though some parties and partisans may never be able to 
directly influence laws and policies, e.g. because they may not have sufficient presence 
within the legislature and/or the executive, they may still have the ability to exercise pressure 
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on those who do have the power to make laws and policies, by demanding justifications for 
their decisions. A legislature in which a greater variety of parties (and, therefore, of societal 
interests) is represented, that is, is more likely to provide a platform in which minority and/or 
marginal voices can express their opposition to proposed laws, and demand that such laws be 
justified based on reasons that take their interests into account. In this sense, the apparent 
political fragmentation of a more diverse party system can in fact contribute to greater 
political cohesion, a cohesion grounded in shared norms of political justification. 
Finally, partisanship can contribute to political cohesion by carrying the bulk of the 
justificatory burden demanded by political liberalism. Here it is necessary to take some 
distance from Rawls’s (2005) ambitious demand that all citizens, whether politically engaged 
or not, ought to justify their proposed laws and policies by complying with the same 
standards of justification that apply to politicians and public officials in general, at least when 
they vote on fundamental political matters, or when they debate such matters in the public 
political realm. Rawls’s demanding standard of political justification can be dangerous for 
political cohesion. As numerous critics of Rawls have observed, asking citizens to translate 
their non-political values and doctrines into the language of public reason may alienate them 
from the political system. This can hardly be considered positive for political cohesion. 
Parties and partisanship can play a key role in this context. By carrying the burden of 
political justification on behalf of ordinary citizens, they can relieve the latter of such a 
burden, and allow them to support their preferred laws and policies on the basis of their 
values and doctrines, whatever the latter might be. While this proposal distances itself from 
the Rawlsian framework, and while it may appear, once again, to hinder rather than foster 
political cohesion, in fact this is not the case. To understand why, we should remember that 
the Rawlsian overlapping consensus, despite its name, is not only about consensus. It is, also, 
about diversity. More specifically, the aim of the overlapping consensus is not only to ensure 
 13 
that laws and policies are justified on the basis of widely shared public reasons, but also that 
the same laws and policies are justified on the basis of citizens’ diverse non-public reasons. 
This is crucial, according to Rawls, in order to guarantee the stability of diverse liberal 
societies over time. And it is another way of saying that political cohesion in such societies 
also requires a differentiated process of political justification. Once again, apparent 
fragmentation can be conducive to political cohesion. 
The role of parties and partisans is crucial, in this context, because parties and 
partisans can both carry out the (directly cohesive) process of public reason justification, by 
advancing and debating public reasons in the public political realm (e.g. in the legislature, 
where this can be favoured by a more fragmented party system, as previously argued) and the 
(indirectly cohesive) process of non-public reason justification, by being responsive to the 
non-public reasons of their constituents. In summary, partisanship can contribute to political 
cohesion in diverse societies, when it is grounded in the ideal of public justification and when 
it is accompanied by political institutions and processes that favour (rather than hinder) the 
expression of diverse societal demands. 
Matteo Bonotti 
 
Partisanship and its Exemplarity Force: A Comment on Bonotti 
There are at least two perspectives from which to defend the value of partisanship – that of 
the politically committed individual, for whom it may be a way to advance a particular cause, 
and that of the unaligned observer, who may see in it a political contribution beyond the 
specific goals of its agents. Recent books have explored both viewpoints (Muirhead 2014; 
Rosenblum 2008; White & Ypi 2016); Bonotti’s is mainly of the second kind. It describes the 
constructive effects of party competition, not just as a means to contain social conflict but as 
a practice that gives life to the ties of citizenship. In the terms of this Critical Exchange, 
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partisanship can foster the cohesiveness of diverse societies. By generating common 
processes of justification that citizens of differing views can connect to, building thereby the 
conditions for the exercise of public reason, party-based modes of participation serve to 
integrate political communities in desirable ways. 
The relationship between Rawlsian public reason and the practices of partisanship is a 
recurrent theme of the book. Different kinds of argument are possible here, the mildest of 
which is to stress the compatibility of the two. As Bonotti shows, despite the circumspection 
with which Rawls viewed comprehensive doctrines in politics, practices of partisanship are 
structured so as to encourage the formulation of political views in generalisable ways. 
Seeking to win elections typically means articulating a programme that appeals to the many, 
and conveying it in widely accessible terms. More boldly, Bonotti suggests that partisanship 
and public reason are not just compatible but complementary. By connecting comprehensive 
doctrines to institutionalised processes of deliberation, parties bring doctrines into contact 
with each other and enable the identification and construction of overlapping consensi. This, 
he suggests, is not just the effect of large parties with a real prospect of entering government: 
even small parties draw their followers into the political system and allow them to influence 
the exercise of public reason through the pressure they exercise on others to justify 
themselves. 
The strongest claim of the book is that partisanship and public reason are not merely 
compatible or complementary but ultimately mutually dependent. Partisanship is what makes 
public reason viable in diverse societies. Partisans speak both the language of public reason 
and of comprehensive doctrines – enough of the former to be good political liberals, enough 
of the latter to keep citizens engaged. Without such mediating agents, Rawls gives us a model 
that seems to ask too much. (Likewise, without an anchoring in public reason, partisanship 
tends towards a politics of interest-group bargaining.). Such claims concerning the mutual 
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dependence of partisanship and public reason lead Bonotti to advocate political measures that 
support and deepen the place partisanship in public life, from state funding for parties to the 
embrace of electoral systems of proportional representation that allow a broader range of 
partisan views to find expression in representative chambers. 
The book presents a defence of the worth of partisanship that is distinctive relative to 
other recent accounts of this kind, emphasising parties as elements in a nearly-just society 
rather than as agents of political transformation. A question that all democratic defences of 
partisanship are likely to face however is whether they rely on an idealised notion of the 
party. A familiar methodological challenge, accentuated perhaps for those who want to 
emphasise the deliberative qualities of partisanship and its potential to foster cohesion, is how 
to pitch a concept of the party that is recognisable in contemporary practice yet not laden 
with the worst features of electoral politics. Does Bonotti’s account rely on too normativised 
a conception of partisanship, addressed to parties as he would like them to be and 
insufficiently attentive to their real-world deficiencies? By emphasising the orientation of 
partisans to liberal-democratic norms, reasonability, political obligation and the like, does he 
simply define the negative features out of the picture? 
In The Force of the Example, Alessandro Ferrara argues against the tendency to 
counterpose things as they are and things as they should be (Ferrara 2008). Such a dichotomy 
overlooks a third possibility: things that are as they should be. For the critically-minded 
scholar, the aim should be neither to catalogue the world in its imperfections, nor to prescribe 
what does not exist but ought to, but to reflect on the normative potential embodied in 
existing practices at their best. This seems a helpful way to think about contemporary 
accounts of the place of partisanship in political theory, including Bonotti’s. Such accounts 
plausibly combine normative and empirical elements to the extent that there exist real-world 
instances that give credence to their stronger claims. 
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There are historical examples that can support normativised readings of partisanship, 
as found for instance in some of the large mass parties of the twentieth century. In 
contemporary contexts one might look to the parties emerging out of social movements in the 
Mediterranean and beyond, as well as to ongoing efforts to democratise and revitalise 
established organisations such as the UK Labour Party. Such associations, linked to mass 
movements on the one hand and institutions on the other, recapture some of the ‘bifocal’ 
qualities long associated with the party as an intermediary agent which Bonotti rightly 
emphasises. Experiments in intra-party deliberation hold the potential to develop the model 
further (Invernizzi Accetti and Wolkenstein 2017). There is also research that suggests 
normative conceptions of partisanship can be usefully deployed to the analysis of 
contemporary parties in some unlikely settings (Herman 2016, 2017). 
Bonotti’s argument would seem to rest not just on their being exemplary parties but 
exemplary party systems. Public reason is exercised through an interplay of agents rather 
than the contribution of one. This is a demanding thought, perhaps especially in times of 
political volatility, but not a wholly implausible one. Examining the real-world cases that can 
support normative claims about partisanship looks a valuable way to extend research on these 
themes. 
Jonathan White 
 
A Democratic Theory of Political Cohesion 
Theories of justice and theories of democracy typically assume, at least implicitly, that they 
will in some way promote political cohesion in a political community by way of facilitating 
common commitment among individuals to a rightful political project. A standard view is 
that the rightfulness of democratic procedures and just institutions respectively will give 
individuals powerful reasons to give their support to the political community. This 
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formulation, however, may be too cerebral. To understand how rightful institutions promote 
political cohesion, it is not enough to focus on an abstract endorsement of their rightfulness 
by individuals. It is also important to understand how the direct experience of these 
institutions and their processes generate political cohesion by promoting a more aesthetic 
sense among individuals that they are recognised by and belong to the political community. 
The ways in which a political arrangement facilitates cohesion in a political community may 
be referred to as its centripetal effects. 
This contribution will be limited to focusing upon how the rightfulness of democracy 
in particular, and the forms of political action it engenders, can contribute to political 
cohesion. I will explore how partisan political representation operating in a competitive 
context framed by various types of voting opportunities are the main engines of political 
cohesion in a democratic society. Before doing so, I first attempt to explain the normative 
basis or rightfulness of such institutions. In my book, Centripetal Democracy, I define the 
internal purpose of democracy (or what democracy aims at as a rightful ideal of self-rule) as 
maximizing individuals’ equal opportunities for control over the political power in which 
they have a stake as members of a collectively self-governing political community. 
Control is the key term in this definition and should be understood in a nuanced way. 
Control is the capacity of an entity to have a direction guiding impact on some state of 
affairs. Following Philip Pettit (2012: 153-5), we can distinguish in this regard between 
control that is active (by way of direct participation in actions that aim at a desired result); 
virtual (by way of refraining from action because the desired result is already being achieved; 
and reserve (by way of foregoing the possibility of acting because one is neutral concerning 
outcomes). What this multidimensional understanding of control demonstrates is that 
maximising citizens’ equal opportunities for control is not about providing the conditions that 
ensure a perpetually active citizenry. Rather, democracy is about guaranteeing that citizens 
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are provided with an opportunity structure that allows them maximum influence over the 
decisions in which they have a stake. 
But what then counts as maximum opportunities? Any ideal that aims to have 
purchase in the real world must reconcile itself to certain realities that provide the context in 
which is it to be interpreted. In the present case, we may refer to these as the ‘circumstances 
of democracy,’ which consist in the fact that i) the demands and enjoyment of private and 
commercial life will restrict the ability and willingness of citizens to be perpetually active in 
collective decision-making ii) the complexity of decision-making limits the extent to which 
citizens can make informed decisions unaided and iii) forum-style decision-making that is 
readily open to the equal participation of all citizens is impracticable beyond a very small 
scale society. 
Considerations of this sort are among common rationales for representative 
institutions, which have the virtue of disburdening ordinary citizens from high volume 
decision-making, while establishing a class of individuals that has the time to take decisions 
in a specialised forum and the resources to ensure that their decisions are informed by 
expertise. While we may agree with this rationale, what is almost universally lacking from 
normative accounts of representative democracy is a guiding principle for regulating the 
power differentials between ordinary citizens and their representatives. For this reason, I 
posit the democratic difference principle, which states that all increases in control over the 
decision-making process of some citizens above others must contribute to an increase in 
control over this process for each citizen. This principle is derived from the logic of the 
democratic purpose (stated above) when confronted with the circumstances of democracy. 
Effectively, individuals seeking to maximise their equal opportunities for control will only 
agree to give up some of their control to others if this will in fact increase their opportunities 
for political control. 
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As we have seen, representative institutions clearly meet this criterion. Rather than 
minimising democracy by taking decision-making into their own hands, they in fact make 
modern democracy practicable. Moreover, selecting these representatives at regular elections 
by way of universal suffrage gives citizens the power of both selection and sanction, while 
providing incentives for representatives in office to be responsive to citizens between election 
periods. The democratic difference principle has many more implications than this. Most 
noteworthy, and sufficient to detail for present purposes, is the endorsement of a scheme of 
direct democracy. Certainly, citizens seeking to maximise their equal opportunities for 
control would be unlikely to give their representatives more autonomy than what may be 
necessary to make democracy possible in the face of the circumstances of democracy. 
At least three types of direct voting opportunities would be required to satisfy the 
democratic appetite of these citizens: mandatory referendums (whereby a government cannot 
change a law deemed to be of special importance without first seeking approval by the 
people); optional referendums (which allow for a threshold of citizens to call for a popular 
vote on an issue that has passed through parliament) and citizens initiatives (which allows for 
a certain threshold of citizens to propose new legislation for popular vote). 
Important to note here is that the democratic difference principle does not make 
prescriptions concerning how active citizens ought to be in making use of these bottom-up 
voting mechanisms (the optional referendum and citizens’ initiative), nor how much citizens 
should turn out to vote. In both cases, there is no democratic problem with citizens lack of 
participation, so long as these phenomena are primarily due to a meaningful exercise of 
absentee citizens’ virtual or reserve control (rather than due to socioeconomic factors that 
systematically discourage disadvantaged individuals from participating). The key normative 
demand is that citizens have an efficacious opportunity structure that allows them to become 
directly active in decision-making when they decide to do so. What the democratic difference 
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principle does provide against, however, is oversaturating the demos with too many votes on 
a given day or throughout the year. Appropriate scheduling of votes and sufficiently high 
thresholds of citizens support required to call a popular vote can easily address these 
problems. 
When appropriately designed, and constrained (e.g. by prohibiting votes that would 
challenge the rights and liberties constitutive of democracy), we may expect direct voting 
opportunities to work in tandem with elections and representative institutions in developing 
deep forms of political cohesion within a political community. I now detail only some of the 
centripetal effects that these various institutions may be expected to engender. 
A regularly noted centripetal feature of electoral democracy is the fact that the always 
forthcoming vote provides the electoral losers with good reason to maintain commitment to 
the political community in the hopes that they will fare better on the next occasion. More 
recent work in political theory has drawn positive attention to the fact that, due to the need to 
appeal to a wide voter base over time, elections incentivise partisan claims couched in the 
common good among political representatives vying for political power (see Matteo 
Bonotti’s contribution to this Critical Exchange). Such a form of political discourse further 
facilitates electoral losers in their support for the political community: to the extent that the 
government is formed on a partisan basis framed in accord with relatively inclusive norms, 
electoral losers may not reasonably expect to fare too badly under rule by their political 
opponents. 
Less recognised is the manner in which bottom-up institutions of direct democracy 
can reinforce the ability of democratic institutions to ensure political cohesion that extends to 
electoral losers. On the one hand, such institutions provide citizens with a direct route to 
contesting the government, thus ensuring that they have efficacious opportunities to influence 
representative institutions in between electoral periods. On the other hand, the fact that 
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different types of issues will be subject to popular votes over time, we can expect the 
formation of multiple majorities, thereby increasing the likelihood that individuals will find 
themselves on the winning side of a policy dispute on at least some occasions. Moreover, on 
some issues, electoral opponents are likely to find themselves allied. 
Although voting is often viewed as a normatively shallow mode of decision-making 
when compared to a deliberative procedure aimed at mutually justified reasons, there are 
powerful centripetal effects laden in the former that often go unacknowledged. Two related 
events transpire around the ballot box – the asking and the voting. The asking transpires 
through political campaigning, where citizens at large are addressed directly and implored to 
help shape the future of the political community. This form of recognition provides the 
centripetal role of affirming to citizens that they belong to and count as part of a future-
oriented political project. The act of voting itself is a performative act that sets in motion its 
own peculiar centripetal effect. By participating in an act that demands an answer to the 
question of what ‘we as a political community will decide and do together’, the citizen is 
implicitly affirming her belonging to and a recognition of the belonging of others in a 
political community whose future is collectively decided together on an equal basis. It stands 
to reason that when citizens are regularly asked to vote in both elections and referendums, 
and frequently take up that invitation, these centripetal effects associated with the ballot box 
will more deeply engrain themselves in the political culture and thereby help to establish a 
form of political cohesion that may not be easy to shake. 
All of these democratic features – representatives engaging in partisan claims in the 
context of electoral and direct voting opportunities – provide a structure to the public sphere 
by setting in motion a centripetal process that may be referred to as discursive integration. 
This phenomenon does not describe a situation where political consensus is achieved, but 
rather denotes the experience of individuals being exposed to the same issues at the same 
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time and in the same way. The importance of discursive integration to political cohesion 
becomes manifest in those political systems where it is hindered. In Belgium and the 
European Union, for example, citizens from the territorially and discursively delineated 
public spheres are called to vote together once every five years for different sets of 
territorially defined political parties. As a result, not only do citizens from different territories 
rarely share discursive themes in any kind of synchronised manner, but the existence of 
different party systems within each territory also ensures that issues are not systematically 
debated in the same way across the public spheres. 
The problems with political cohesion in Belgium and the EU – both of which have to 
some degree suffered lack of support from citizens, including more or less serious demands 
for secession or fundamental reform – can to some extent be viewed as a result of the failure 
to implement a democratic process that sets in motion a robust process of discursive 
integration. The case of Switzerland, by contrast, demonstrates that a unified party system 
and a direct democratic opportunity structure can help to ensure that there are sufficient 
centripetal dynamics operating across several delineated public spheres. Much as with 
democracies that have the advantage of operating with a singular public sphere, the 
developed nature of democratic process in Switzerland ensures that citizens become shaped 
by and recognise one another as part of the same political lifeworld. Its democratic 
institutions are an important reason, albeit not the only one, why Switzerland boasts the kind 
of political cohesion that is apparently lacking in Belgium and the EU. 
This contribution has been a brief attempt to explain how a certain model of 
democracy, centripetal democracy, can contribute to political cohesion. I do not deny that 
there may be instances where the democratic process will fail to promote political cohesion – 
such as when partisanship become perverted by the worst kinds of populism, or when certain 
types of popular votes polarise the community in a deep way. However, a system of 
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centripetal democracy is expected to perform well enough over time to whether these storms 
and maintain the common commitment of citizens to a rightful system of shared rule.  
Joseph Lacey 
 
Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions: A Comment on Lacey 
Joseph Lacey’s contribution to this Critical Exchange addresses the important, yet under 
explored, topic of the role institutional design can play in promoting political cohesion. 
Underlying his argument and the book on which it draws is a distinction between centripetal 
and centrifugal democracy, with Switzerland and Belgium providing exemplars of each 
model respectively. He seeks to argue that certain types of democracy can facilitate the 
discursive integration of citizens by maximising the opportunities they have for influencing 
decisions in ways that enhance their identification with the collective policies of the polity. 
However, identification with a polity involves both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. 
That is identification with a certain political authority as the appropriate locus to make 
decisions and identification with one’s fellow citizens. In ways I shall detail below, I find that 
Lacey’s suggestions largely tackle the vertical dimension without giving adequate 
consideration to the horizontal dimension. Yet, the former builds on the latter, and provides 
the motor of the centrifugal tendencies in Belgium and the centripetal possibilities in 
Switzerland. 
Lacey notes that certain factors of time, complexity and scale constrain the operation 
of democracy, such as demands of private and commercial life, the intricacies and 
technicalities of decision-making in advanced, complex societies and, and the difficulties of 
promoting meaningful deliberation among a group of people above a given size. He calls 
these constraints the ‘circumstances of democracy.’ However, this latter term suggests a 
parallel with what Rawls, following Hume, termed the ‘circumstances of justice’: namely, the 
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circumstances of relative scarcity and limited altruism that make distributional principles 
necessary in the first place. The parallel circumstances in the case of democracy have been 
regarded as disagreement about the principles of justice, on the one side, and the inevitable 
partiality of each individual to his or her own interests and concerns given our limited 
knowledge and experience, as well as a certain selfishness, on the other side. If the first 
makes some political authority necessary to avoid continuous conflict as to who gets what, 
when and how, the second suggests that if that authority is to operate impartially it should be 
democratically organised so as to give all involved an equal say in the collective decisions 
impacting their lives. Meanwhile, to the constraints and circumstances of democracy we need 
to add the conditions for democracy. These relate to the ways the horizontal relations among 
a group of individuals make possible and appropriate their acceptance of a vertical 
relationship with a given democratic political authority. Broadly speaking, the different 
interests and views of a group citizens can be distributed among them in ways that create 
either cross-cutting or segmental cleavages. In the former case, no sub group of citizens will 
consistently line up against another group. The group may be divided on class, religious, and 
ethnic grounds, say, but not all wealthy people will be of one ethnicity and religion with 
poorer people of another ethnicity and religion. As a result, majorities get made up of 
different groups of minorities on different issues. By contrast, in the latter case cleavages do 
line up in this way. As a result, shared values across all groups become less probable, so that 
disagreements are more likely to become polarised, with each group holding on to their own 
partial perspective. It also becomes more probable that not all groups will have an equal stake 
in the totality of collective decisions. Consequently, consistent minorities become more likely 
and the formation of a collective view that accommodates all perspectives harder to achieve. 
If the former case offers propitious conditions for democracy, the latter case makes it 
considerably harder. 
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Both cases can be prone to certain types of centrifugal forces. Both may suffer from a 
degree of disaffection with democracy stemming from what I re-named above as the 
constraints on democracy. That is, the demands of private life, the intricacies of the decisions 
and a sense of the insignificance of one’s own input, can – and in many democracies clearly 
do – all lead to political apathy and even disillusionment with the democratic process. Lacey 
makes some original and important suggestions with regard to this problem. He proposes that 
institutional design be guided by what, adapting Rawls, he calls ‘the democratic difference 
principle,’ whereby ‘all increases in control over the decision-making process of some 
citizens above others must contribute to an increase in control over this process for each 
citizen.’ He argues that the familiar forms of representative democracy have met this criterion 
by rendering democracy practicable in contemporary societies. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges citizens have felt some loss nonetheless. He considers this loss can be partially 
rectified through the introduction of an element of direct democracy similar to the 
referendums commonly employed in Switzerland. The claim is that participation in making a 
concrete decision collectively with others has a centripetal effect both vertically, by giving 
citizens a sense of empowerment, and horizontally, by encouraging deliberation and a feeling 
of common purpose. However, these effects assume that the conditions for democracy exist 
in the sense of the existence of cross-cutting cleavages. As he notes, electoral democracy 
operates best when parties are competing for votes with contrasting visions of the common 
good that will appeal to different coalitions of minorities. Likewise, he sees referendums 
operating best when it is possible for them to propose new legislation or oppose existing 
legislation or policies in ways that might attract different majorities on different occasions. In 
other words, taken together there must be a reasonable chance of most people – at least those 
not advocating unconstitutional views – to win at least some of the time rather than losing all 
the time. 
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Yet, if opinions and interests are segmented, consistent losers can arise. The 
disagreements will be polarised, with no incentive to adopt a less partial view in order to 
build coalitions with other groups. Here the application of the democratic difference principle 
need not in and of itself produce centripetal democracy. Representatives may simply 
represent segmented groups and refuse to dialogue with each other. Referendums will simply 
produce a consistent minority and majority across all issues. In this case, so-called 
majoritarian devices have historically given way to consensus institutions and the devolution 
of a wide range of public services and state powers, including taxation, to the regional level. 
While these serve to hold a segmentally divided political community together, they can also 
serve to consolidate separate political identities in ways that long term have a centrifugal 
effect. Both Scotland and Catalonia offer instances of this phenomenon. 
If one compares Switzerland and Belgium, then although both involve a linguistic 
divide it operates in different ways. In Switzerland, the main German vs French (with Italian 
speakers a smaller group) division is cross cut by the religious and wealth division. In other 
words, there are both Catholic and Protestant as well as wealthy and less wealthy cantons in 
both the French and German speaking communities. Therefore, although the public sphere is 
linguistically divided and to some degree divided by canton as well, there is not a consistent 
divide between the French and German communities. This has allowed parties to be national, 
with no asymmetric or growing demand for the devolution of state powers. Meanwhile, the 
coalition at the Federal level is fairly stable. That is far less the case in Belgium with regard 
to the main linguistic divide between Flemish and French speakers (the German speaking 
group being far smaller). This division is also a division between richer and poorer regions, 
with a historic background of the dominance of the once richer but now poorer French 
region, although both communities have been mainly Catholic. It is these more segmented 
social conditions that have led Belgium to adopt an institutional design with centrifugal rather 
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than centripetal implications. All of which is to say that the drivers of political cohesion may 
be as much social as political. Institutional design has a limited autonomous effect that has to 
be related to pre-existing social conditions. 
Richard Bellamy 
 
Emancipation: Political Cohesion in a New Key 
Today it is often claimed that society is falling apart. Many democratic countries witness 
growing estrangement between urban elites and the surrounding countryside, between the 
haves and the have nots and between natives and newcomers. The rise of socially dividing 
tendencies has generated a quest for new ways to create political cohesion. Instead of merely 
asking what makes democratic institutions just or legitimate, political theorists have started to 
explore their integrative function. How can parties, publics and elections assist in fostering 
commitment to a common political project among people living together as strangers? 
The endeavor to explore the role of democratic processes as drivers of political 
cohesion is a welcome addition to the more loyalty-based approaches of political 
commitment prevalent in contemporary debates on civic integration. The critical attention is 
less on the virtues and merits of democratic peoples, and more on the virtues and merits of 
democratic processes: What do they have to be like in order for people to commit to them in 
a critically sound and sustained way? In this contribution, I would like to add a new 
perspective to the literature on political cohesion. The claim I will make is that democracy is 
a political lifeform animated and sustained by a principle of emancipation, and emancipated 
lives are not merely created through political processes linked to parties, publics and 
elections. They are created through policies in such fields as education, work, citizenship and 
housing. 
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Close to home, day-to-day and material, policies in these areas have often fallen under 
the radar of political theorists. They have been dismissed as ‘social’ rather than ‘political.’ 
The main point of this contribution is to argue that policies not only are political; they are 
vital to the regeneration of democracy. If one wishes to put a halt to the divisive tendencies 
that plague present-day democracies one ought therefore to pay critical attention to the 
principles that are operative in these more mundane areas of political life: Do they foster or 
undermine commitment to democratic practices and ideals? 
I will proceed in three steps. First, I will clarify what it means to define democracy as a 
political lifeform. Second, I will briefly elucidate the meaning of emancipation. Finally, I will 
return to the topic of this symposium, namely political cohesion. The aim is to illustrate how 
policies in the field of citizenship—and more precisely, in the field of social rights—have the 
capacity to foster or undermine commitment to democracy, all depending on the principles 
that animate and sustain them. 
The description of democracy as a political lifeform draws on pillars first laid out by 
Montesquieu in The Spirit of Laws ([1748], 1989) According to Montesquieu, there are three 
political forms; republics, monarchies and despotisms. Each form has its own nature and 
principle, which together give direction and coherence to political life: The ‘nature’ of a 
political form refers to who governs, and how. In a republic, it is the body of the people who 
governs, and they do so by choosing ministers who conduct tasks for them. In a monarchy, it 
is the king who governs, and he does so by means of fixed laws and the intermediary powers 
of the nobility. In a despotic political form, finally, it is the despot who governs, and he does 
so without laws and intermediaries but through a vizier who executes his discretionary 
power. Still, these political forms would not be able to endure without someone giving life to 
them by adhering to and enacting their respective power. The ‘principle’ therefore refers to 
the commitment needed to set and keep these political forms in motion. It is what makes 
 29 
them tick: public virtue or love of the country and the law in a republic, honor or striving for 
distinction and superiority in a monarchy, and finally fear in a despotic form (Montesquieu 
1989, Book III).  
By making reference to these principles, Montesquieu adds a dynamic element to the 
classical study of political forms. Rather than categorizing different political forms and their 
distorted variants with reference to number—the one, the few or the many—he makes the 
continuity of a political lifeform dependent on its combination of actions and institutions. The 
supposition is that ‘[j]ust as some motors only “go” on petrol, different governments have 
different drives that set them into motion’ (Althusser 2007, 46). Unless people act on the 
principle of virtue, honour and fear, and unless laws, decrees, institutions, and policies 
encourage commitment to these same principles the republican, monarchical and despotic 
political form will eventually peter out. They will lose their animating force, or spirit.  
The principle is vital to the cohesion of a political lifeform, for two reasons. First, it 
integrates the political with the social (Singer 2013). In Montesquieu’s view, virtue, honor 
and fear do not merely foster commitment to the power of the people, the king and the 
despot; they extend into more ordinary areas of life, including education, luxury, taxation and 
the condition of women. It is in these areas that a political lifeform becomes a ‘life’ in the 
more concrete sense of the term. Second, while virtue, honor and fear refer to the principle 
needed to sustain a political lifeform, they also serve as immanent ‘standards of right and 
wrong’ (Arendt 1994, 335). In a republic, for example, laws, institutions and policies are 
evaluated on the basis of how well they protect public virtue against private benefit, and in a 
monarchical form they are evaluated on the basis of how well they guard honour and 
distinction against baseness and equality. 
What then is the nature and principle of a democratic political lifeform? Who 
governs, and by what commitment? These are the questions that I seek to answer in my 
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forthcoming book, The Spirit of Democracy: Sources of Corruption and Renewal. Since the 
space for elaboration is severely limited, let me present the main argument in the form of two 
bullet points, before I move on to discuss its implications for the debate on political cohesion. 
First, and starting with who governs, a democratic political lifeform does not have a 
natural source of authority. It is not anchored in a body of people, a king or a despot. In a 
democratic form, we debate who governs. That is precisely why we have parties, publics and 
regular elections; to be able to judge and decide who ought to be entrusted with the task to 
govern. In the words of Brian Singer, we could say that democracy ‘is not so much a struggle 
between classes within society as a struggle over society, over the definitions of what society 
is and should be’ (Singer 1986, 68). Second, the principle needed to set and keep this political 
dynamic in motion is emancipation. What is characteristic for a democratic political lifeform 
is that while it removes all external limitations on political affairs (God, nature and history), it 
does not shy away from the abyss of freedom and responsibility that this removal generates in 
the exercise of politics. Instead of escaping the uncertainty it generates by projecting freedom 
and responsibility onto a natural source of authority, it encourages human beings to face up to 
the task of emancipation by creating institutions that equitably divide up the burden of 
judgment and decision-making. The result is existential relief, and a unique sense of freedom: 
equal time and space to experiment with new ways of living, thinking and doing democratic 
politics. As I argue, it is commitment to this principle of emancipation that gives direction 
and coherence to a democratic political lifeform, including parties, publics and elections. It 
makes sure that while everyone has an equal say on the purpose and direction of society, no 
one has the final say. There is always room for yet another debate on who ‘we, the people’ 
are. 
Political processes are vital to the regeneration of democracy, but so are policies 
related to education, citizenship, work and housing. Policies in these fields are not merely 
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social. They are political insofar as they embody principles that have the capacity to 
undermine or reinforce the democratic political form in which they operate. The plural sense 
of the term ‘principles’ in the above sentence is not coincidental. No political lifeform is 
guided by a single principle. On the contrary, each form is guided by a combination of 
principles that coexist and compete for our attention. What allows us to say that a political 
form is ‘democratic’ rather than ‘monarchical’ or ‘republican’, is that emancipation trumps 
honour and virtue in a sustained way, both in the enactment and judgment of politics. Let me 
end by briefly clarifying this point in relation to recent developments in the field of 
citizenship: the privatization of social services.  
Since the 1980s, a myriad of policy steps has been taken towards the privatization of 
social services, including schools, healthcare, childcare and infrastructure. The ambition has 
been to empower individuals by increasing their freedom of choice, and so making them 
personally responsible for the actions and choices they make, or indeed fail to undertake. In 
political theory, the privatization of social services has typically been seen as a matter of 
social justice and welfare politics. It has been reduced to a conflict between left and right, or 
between collective and individual ways of organizing ‘the social question.’ The result is that 
in political theory little attention has been paid to the democratic significance of the 
privatization of social services (but see Brown 2015; Honig 2017), let alone to its bearing on 
the commitment needed to foster democratic practices and ideals. 
As a closer inspection reveals, however, the principle that guides the privatization of 
social services has more in common with the commitment needed to sustain a monarchy than 
a democracy (Näsström & Kalm 2015). The principle of monarchy is honour, and by honour 
is meant the aspiration for ‘preferences and distinctions’ (Montesquieu 1989, Book III, 27). 
The problem is that when market-based solutions are allowed to dominate social areas, and 
the benefits and risks of life are privatized the striving for distinction may take precedence 
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over emancipation in the enactment and judgment of politics. In order to survive ‘the rat 
race’, we are encouraged to cultivate certain manners and attitudes that might give us an 
advantage over others in the competition for security and status, such as ambition, politeness 
and resourcefulness (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002, 23). Moreover, we are taught to 
evaluate the actions of ourselves and others on this basis, which means that once we have 
received a particular rank it becomes important to ‘do or suffer nothing that might show that 
we consider ourselves inferior to the rank itself’ (Montesquieu 1989, Book III, 34). 
This priority of distinction over emancipation does not enhance freedom in society. 
Instead of giving everyone equal time and space to reflect upon the world that they share, 
including what the rat race does to human relations, it pins individuals against individuals in 
a constant fight for security and status. The trouble is that if this development continues it 
may in the long run undermine the support needed to sustain democracy. It may nurture ‘a 
market for monarchy;’ i.e. commitment to a strong leader backed up by (quasi-) religious, 
natural and historical guarantees (Näsström & Kalm 2015, 566). By fostering competition for 
status and positions, and at the same time offering human consolation in the case of 
misfortune such a monarchical combination could prove custom-designed for a society 
divided into ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ 
Needless to say, this example is neither complete nor exhaustive; examples could be 
taken from other policy-fields, including education, work and housing. The main point is that 
in times of democratic discontent, critical attentiveness to the difference between political 
lifeforms, and the complex ways in which they interrelate and compete for our attention is 
more important than ever. To come to terms with socially dividing tendencies it is not enough 
to focus on the political cohesion created by parties, publics and elections. We need to pay 
attention to the principles that are active in the field of social policies: Do they foster virtue, 
honor and distinction, fear and/or emancipation? 
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Sofia Näsström 
 
Emancipation, Equality and Democratic Cohesion: A Comment on Näsström 
Sofia Näsström’s contribution (and forthcoming book) offers a fascinating renewal and 
extension of Montesquieu’s approach to reflecting on political lifeforms. In identifying the 
spirit of democracy with emancipation, she aims to provide a perspective from which both to 
integrate the social with the political (in a way that, for example, Arendt fails to do) and to 
provide an immanent standard of judgment, of right and wrong, appropriate to that form of 
political life. Political cohesion is rethought from this perspective not as a matter of shared 
national identity, constitutional patriotism or common values but as the shared practice of 
sustaining of a reflexive relationship between democratic citizens in and through which they 
experience the freedom of, and in, participating in governing the terms and conditions of 
democratic citizenship. This is, I think, a valuable and genuinely intellectually exciting 
approach, however, I will endeavor to raise some critical concerns with respect to the 
principle of emancipation that is at the heart of her account. 
Let me begin though by pointing to some of the merits of this approach. In her article, 
Näsström points to the privatization of social services as giving rise to the domination of 
society by market-based solutions such that ‘the striving for distinction may take precedence 
over emancipation in the enactment and judgment of politics’ since we are thereby 
incentivized, even constrained, ‘to cultivate certain manners and attitudes that might give us 
an advantage over others in the competition for security and status, such as ambition, 
politeness and resourcefulness’ and ‘taught to evaluate the actions of ourselves and others on 
this basis, which means that once we have received a particular rank it becomes important to 
“do or suffer nothing that might show that we consider ourselves inferior to the rank itself”’. 
This acute point can be extended to encompass the multiple forms of everyday 
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inegalitarianism shaping our social relationships and interactions that Michael Sandel 
documents in What Money Can’t Buy (2012) and Näsström’s framework is well-placed to 
accommodate and give political extension to the arguments of relational egalitarians such as 
Debra Satz that ‘lurking behind many if not all, noxious markets are problems relating to the 
standing of the parties before, during, and after the process of exchange’ (2010: 93). We 
might further note that this marketization process is linked to a shift to ‘flexible labour’ and 
the ‘ambition … to empower individuals by increasing their freedom of choice’ seen in the 
privatization of social services is part of a wider – and pernicious (Mounk, 2017) – policy 
turn to a picture of ‘personal responsibility’ that situates individuals as the entrepreneurs of 
their own lives and labour, and which, in a context of increased precarity, leads naturally to a 
state of ongoing anxiety, fear and self-blame that aligns with the despotic form as well as the 
monarchic. Moreover, Näsström’s argument also seems well-placed – to take an example she 
mentions but does not have space to address – to integrate consideration of the economic 
workplace as a significant site of social relationships and interactions, and one that, as 
Anderson’s recent work in Private Government (2017) shows, does not align with – and may 
play a role in undermining – the principle of democracy that Näsström articulates. (This may 
have particular salience in the contemporary economic order as the division between work 
time and leisure or home time is, for increasing numbers of workers, blurred and frayed.)  
However, while I appreciate the potentially capacious critical power of her framework 
to integrate the relationship between politics and society in order to articulate what we may 
think of as ‘infrastructures of democratic life,’ I am less sure about the sense in which the 
principle of emancipation provides immanent standards of judgment because I am less sure 
about the status and meaning of this principle. Central to Näsström’s argument about 
democracy as a political lifeform is the idea that there ‘is always room for yet another debate 
on who “we, the people” are’ – but what exactly does she intend by this?  
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There are two different ways in which we can understand the question of ‘who “we, 
the people” are.’ The first, which we may call ‘the scope reading’, is in terms of who is 
included within, or excluded from, democratic citizenship – and relates to the demos (or 
democratic boundary) problem. The second, which we may call ‘the character reading,’ 
concerns how we understand what makes us a democratic people and what this requires from 
us. These questions are practically interdependent in that how we answer one is likely to 
shape our answer to the other. A polity in which women or those who don’t own property are 
excluded from political membership is likely to conceive of what being free and equal means, 
and what conditions are necessary to sustain this standing, in different ways to a polity that 
includes such groups. But the questions are not the same. So how are we to understand the 
central – indeed, dynamic – role that this question plays in Näsström’s argument concerning 
the principle of emancipation as the spirit of democracy? One way of construing her 
argument would run thus. If we consider her stress on democracy as the political lifeform that 
‘encourages human beings to face up to the task of emancipation by creating institutions that 
equitably divide up the burden of judgment and decision-making’ and issues in ‘existential 
relief, and a unique sense of freedom: equal time and space to experiment with new ways of 
living, thinking and doing democratic politics,’ it seems that it is the second character sense 
that is in play. Thus, suppose that, formally, we understand our character as free and equal 
members of a collectively self-ruling polity and hence our concern as those conditions that 
enable us to stand to each other as free and equal members of a collectively self-ruling polity. 
Democracy is, then, the reflexive relationship of members determining how they understand 
their status as democratic citizens in terms of what they take to be an equitable division of the 
burdens of judgment and of decision-making and the conditions that enable or support their 
practical experience of this status in terms of the conditions that allow ‘equal time and space 
to experiment with new ways of living, thinking and doing democratic politics.’ However, as 
 36 
the example of women and the propertyless given above illustrates, how these formal notions 
are filled in will be practically related to how the who question in its first scope sense is 
answered – and perhaps this is why Näsström takes the question of who ‘we, the people’ are 
to be central: practical reflection on who is to be included effects what we take our 
democratic peoplehood to be and how we should stand to one another; practical reflection on 
what we are and how we should stand to one another effects who we think should be included 
– and hence the scope and character senses of who ‘we, the people’ are construct an ongoing 
dynamic that drives the principle of emancipation. That at least is one way of understanding 
Näsström’s stress on the centrality of this question. 
One further issue arises fairly naturally from the discussion thus far: what difference, 
if any, does the fact that the democratic form that Näsström addresses is that of a democratic 
state make to her argument? Given the form of her argument, I take it that the principle of 
emancipation is the spirit of democracy and not solely the democratic state, so what 
difference if any does fact that spirit of democracy is encased in a state form make – and 
what difference does it make to reflection on political cohesion? To see why this question 
matters, we can consider the issue raised by Näsström’s approach both from the standpoint of 
a concern with democratization and the standpoint of a concern with the specifics of a 
democratic state as opposed to other forms or sites of democratic governance.  
In relation to the standpoint of democratization, consider two cases: 
Case A: an authoritarian state introduces limited democratic government at municipal 
level. 
Case B: within an only nominally democratic state, a wide variety of private clubs are 
organized democratically. 
We know on Näsström’s view that states can (will?) contain varied principles – hence 
her concern about the privatization of social services. It would seem to follow that she holds 
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that, in Case A, the authoritarian state that is, let us suppose, attempting to reduce or contain 
popular discontent by offering restricted opportunities for democratic life at the municipal 
level may, inadvertently, be supporting not only the development of civic-political skills 
among its subjects but also the development of the principle of emancipation (the spirit of 
democracy). Similarly, in Case B, Näsström’s argument would seem to suggest that such 
democratic clubs are likely to provide some (even if weak) support for the move to a more 
substantive level of democracy in the state. This raises the interesting possibility of testing 
Näsström’s view by investigating whether municipal democratization or participation in 
democratic clubs has any salient effects on the political attitudes of the ‘citizens.’ One could 
also look within existing established democracies at the effects on civic attitudes and 
engagement of participation in democratic innovations such as citizen’s juries, mini-publics 
or participatory budgeting structures. The question of whether democracy in sub-state polities 
or even private clubs can act as a force against political cohesion in non-democratic contexts 
or as a driver of further democratization in weakly (or well-established) democratic contexts 
is opened up by the structuring of her argument in terms of Montesquieu’s approach. 
In relation to the issue of the state form of the democratic state, we should note the 
contrast between the state as both an impersonal public authority that structures and sets the 
rules for sub-state polities and the conditions of legitimate private associations, and the state 
as a political form that is not subject (except voluntarily) to any higher public authority. The 
salience of the former is that it raises the question of how the organization of the levels of 
public governance within the state matters to sustaining the spirit of democracy (consider the 
issue of secession raised in Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland) and the question of how much 
freedom of association in civil society is compatible with sustaining the spirit of democracy 
(consider sports club that choose to exclude black or female citizens). The salience of the 
latter is that it raises acutely the demos problem both in terms of the position of non-citizen 
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residents and in terms of non-resident citizens (not to go into more contested territory). The 
case of non-citizen residents raises the question of whether and, if so, how the spirit of 
democracy can survive in a state in which significant parts of the population are excluded 
from citizenship or political membership. The case of non-resident citizens raises the 
question of whether and, if so, how the spirit of democracy can be sustained if a significant 
part of the citizenry does not reside in the state and share the burdens of the choices to which 
residents are subject. There are good reasons in a world of independent states for states as 
intergenerational communities to allow relatively easy naturalization and to allow citizens 
who live abroad to maintain their citizenship and, hence, to allow dual nationality (Baubock, 
2017). But then our discussion of both the spirit of democracy and the issue of political 
cohesion become inseparable from international, transnational, and global politics. The 
principle of emancipation cannot only be a inward-facing principle organizing the relations of 
those within the territory of the state, it must also be an outward-facing principle that 
addresses relations of citizenship between and across states. The question of political 
cohesion cannot coherently be addressed as a question about the political society within the 
territorial borders of the state because the relevant political society is transnational in scope. 
It is one of the merits of Näsström’s view that it not only reconceives the character of 
political cohesion but also moves our view of it beyond the bounds of methodological statism 
within which it has been trapped. 
David Owen 
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